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Abstract
Deep models, while being extremely flexible and
accurate, are surprisingly vulnerable to “small,
imperceptible” perturbations known as adversar-
ial attacks. While the majority of existing attacks
focus on measuring perturbations under the `p
metric, Wasserstein distance, which takes geom-
etry in pixel space into account, has long been
known to be a suitable metric for measuring im-
age quality and has recently risen as a compelling
alternative to the `p metric in adversarial attacks.
However, constructing an effective attack under
the Wasserstein metric is computationally much
more challenging and calls for better optimiza-
tion algorithms. We address this gap in two ways:
(a) we develop an exact yet efficient projection
operator to enable a stronger projected gradient
attack; (b) we show that the Frank-Wolfe method
equipped with a suitable linear minimization ora-
cle works extremely fast under Wasserstein con-
straints. Our algorithms not only converge faster
but also generate much stronger attacks. For in-
stance, we decrease the accuracy of a residual
network on CIFAR-10 to 3.4% within a Wasser-
stein perturbation ball of radius 0.005, in contrast
to 65.6% using the previous Wasserstein attack
based on an approximate projection operator. Fur-
thermore, employing our stronger attacks in ad-
versarial training significantly improves the ro-
bustness of adversarially trained models.
1. Introduction
Deep models are surprisingly vulnerable to adversarial at-
tacks, namely small or even imperceptible perturbations that
completely change the prediction (Szegedy et al., 2014).
The existence of adversarial examples has raised a lot of
security concerns on deep models, and a substantial amount
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Figure 1: `∞, `2 and Wasserstein adversarial examples
generated by projected gradient descent (PGD) with dual
projection. While l∞ and l2 norm adversarial examples tend
to perturb the background, Wasserstein adversarial examples
redistribute the pixel mass.
of work has devoted to this emerging field (Goodfellow
et al., 2018), including various attacks as well as defences
(e.g. Goodfellow et al., 2015; Papernot et al., 2016; Carlini
& Wagner, 2017; Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016; Kurakin
et al., 2017; Madry et al., 2018). Some empirical defences
are shown ineffective later under stronger attacks (Athalye
et al., 2018), which has motivated a line of research on certi-
fied defences with provable guarantees (e.g. Wong & Kolter,
2018; Tjeng et al., 2019; Gowal et al., 2019; Raghunathan
et al., 2018; Cohen et al., 2019).
The majority of existing work on adversarial robustness
focused on the `p threat model where the perturbation is
measured using the `p norm. However, the `p norm, de-
spite being computationally convenient, is long known to
be a poor proxy for measuring image similarity: two se-
mantically similar images for human perception are not
necessarily close under `p norm, see (e.g. Wang & Bovik,
2009) for some astonishing examples. To this end, threat
models beyond `p norms have been proposed, e.g. Engstrom
et al. (2019) explore geometric transformation to fool deep
networks; Laidlaw & Feizi (2019) use point-wise functions
on pixel values to flip predictions; Tramer & Boneh (2019)
study robustness against multiple (`p) perturbations.
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Table 1: A summary of projected Sinkhorn and our proposed algorithms. 3rd and 4th column: Computational complexity
for a single iteration of each algorithm (without or with local transportation constraint). n is the dimension of inputs, and
k is the local transportation region size (see §5.1). 5th column: The exact convergence rate of projected Sinkhorn is not
known yet. Last column: Whether the method is an exact or approximate algorithm.
method optimization space cost/iter cost/iter (local) convergence rate exact?
projected Sinkhorn (Wong et al., 2019) image space O(n2) O(nk2) ? 7
dual projection (ours) coupling matrix O(n2 log n) O(nk2 log k) linear 3
dual linear minimization oracle (ours) coupling matrix O(n2) O(nk2) linear 7
In the same spirit, Wong et al. (2019) recently proposed the
Wasserstein threat model, i.e., adversarial examples are sub-
ject to a perturbation budget measured by the Wasserstein
distance (a.k.a. earth mover’s distance, see e.g. Peyré &
Cuturi, 2019). The idea is to redistribute pixel mass instead
of adjusting each pixel value as in previous `p threat models.
Examples of Wasserstein adversarial attacks (generated by
our algorithm) and comparison to `2 and `∞ adversarial
attacks are shown in Figure 1. A key advantage of the for-
mer is that it explicitly captures geometric information in
the image space (i.e. how mass moves around matters). For
example, a slight translation or rotation of an image usually
induces small change in the Wasserstein distance, but may
change the lp distance drastically. In addition, Wasserstein
distance has played a pivotal role in generative adversarial
networks (Arjovsky et al., 2017), computer vision (Rubner
et al., 1997), and much beyond (Peyré & Cuturi, 2019).
Contributions Generating Wasserstein adversarial exam-
ples requires solving a Wasserstein constrained optimization
problem. Wong et al. (2019) developed a projected gradient
attack using approximate projection (projected Sinkhorn),
which we find sometimes too crude and generating subop-
timal attacks. In this work, we develop two stronger and
faster attacks, based on reformulating the optimization prob-
lem (§2) and applying projected gradient descent (PGD)
and Frank-Wolfe (FW), respectively. For the PGD attack,
we design a specialized algorithm to compute the projection
exactly, which significantly improves the attack quality (§3).
For FW, we develop a faster algorithm to solve the linear
minimization step with entropic smoothing (§4). Both sub-
routines enjoy fast linear convergence rates. Synthetic exper-
iments on simple convex functions (Table 2) show that both
algorithms are able to converge to high precision solutions.
Extensive experiments on large scale datasets (§6) confirm
the improved quality and speed of our attacks. In particu-
lar, for the first time we successfully construct Wasserstein
adversarial examples on the ImageNet dataset. A quick com-
parison of projected Sinkhorn and our algorithms is shown
in Table 1. Finally, we show that employing our stronger
and faster attacks in adversarial training can significantly
improve the robustness of adversarially trained models. Our
implementation is available at https://github.com/
watml/fast-wasserstein-adversarial.
2. Formulation
Wasserstein distance (a.k.a. earth mover’s distance) is a
metric defined on the space of finite measures with equal
total mass (Peyré & Cuturi, 2019). For images, we view
them as discrete measures supported on pixel locations. Let
x, z ∈ [0, 1]n be two vectorized images such that 1>x =
1>z (equal mass). Their Wasserstein distance is defined as:
W(x, z) = min
Π≥0
〈Π, C〉 s.t. Π1 = x,Π>1 = z, (1)
where C ∈ Rn×n is a cost matrix, with Cij representing
the cost of transportation from the i-th to the j-th pixel;
and Π ∈ Rn×n is a transportation/coupling matrix, with
Πij representing the amount of mass transported from the
i-th to the j-th pixel. Intuitively, Wasserstein distance mea-
sures the minimum cost to move mass from x to z. Unlike
usual statistical divergences (e.g. KL), Wasserstein distance
takes the distance between pixels into account hence able to
capture the underlying geometry. It has been widely used
in statistics, image processing, graphics, machine learning,
etc., see the excellent monograph (Peyré & Cuturi, 2019).
Throughout the paper, w.l.o.g. we assume that all entries in
the cost matrix C are nonnegative and Cij = 0 ⇔ i = j.
All common cost matrices satisfy this assumption.
2.1. PGD with projected Sinkhorn
Given a deep model that already minimizes some training
loss E`(X,Y ;θ), we fix (hence also suppress in notation)
the model parameter θ and aim to generate adversarial exam-
ples by maximizing the loss ` subject to some perturbation
budget on an input image x. Following Wong et al. (2019),
we use the Wasserstein distance to measure perturbations:
maximize
z∈[0,1]n
`(z, y) s.t. W(x, z) ≤ δ = 1>x, (2)
where the perturbation budget δ is proportional to the total
mass in the input image x and  indicates the “proportion”.
We focus on untargeted attack throughout, where y is the
true label of the input image x. All techniques in this paper
can be easily adapted for targeted attacks as well.
To optimize (2), Wong et al. (2019) developed an approxi-
mate projection operator to the Wasserstein ball constraint,
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Table 2: (Exact) Wasserstein distancesW(a, pˆ) and number of dual iterations in projected Sinkhorn in the first four columns.
γ is the entropic regularization constant. Projected Sinkhorn encountered numerical issues for small γ = 5 · 10−5.
γ
10−3 2 · 10−4 10−4 5 · 10−5 ours ground truthW iter W iter W iter W iter PGD FW
 = 0.5 0.267 28 0.402 44 0.437 205 − − 0.500 0.500 0.500
 = 1.0 0.356 21 0.498 111 0.555 197 − − 0.797 0.797 0.797
called projected Sinkhorn, to enable the projected gradi-
ent (PGD) adversarial attack (Madry et al., 2018). The
approximate projection is based on solving an entropic reg-
ularized quadratic program (see Appendix A). However, we
observed that this approximation is not always accurate in
practice. To test this, we randomly generate two vectors
a,b ∈ [0, 1]400 with unit total mass. The initial Wasserstein
distance between a and b is 0.797. Next, we project b us-
ing projected Sinkhorn onto Wasserstein balls centered at
a with two different radii  = 0.5 and  = 1.0, respectively.
We report in Table 2 the number of iterations for projected
Sinkhorn to output an approximate projection pˆ, and we
compute the (exact) Wasserstein distance between a and pˆ
using a linear programming solver for (1).
In the first row of Table 2, we expectW(a, pˆ) = 0.5, since
for an exterior point the exact projection should be at the
boundary of the Wasserstein ball. In the second row, we
expect W(a, pˆ) = 0.797, since an exact projection of an
interior point should be itself. However, in both cases, the ac-
tual Wasserstein distances of projected Sinkhorn are always
much smaller than the ground truth. AlthoughW(a, pˆ) gets
closer to the ground truth as γ (the entropic regularization
constant) decreases, non-negligible gaps remain. Further de-
creasing γ may potentially reduce the approximation error,
but (a) overly small γ causes numerical issues easily and
(b) the number of iterations increases as γ decreases. As
we will confirm in §6, this approximation error in projected
Sinkhorn leads to a substantially suboptimal attack. In com-
parison, we minimize the quadratic objective in (Euclidean)
projection iteratively by PGD with dual projection (§3) and
by FW with dual LMO (§4). Their outputs are exact in the
first three digits after the decimal point, which serves as a
simple sanity check of our algorithms in the convex setting.
2.2. Our Reformulation
The large approximation error in projected Sinkhorn moti-
vates us to develop more accurate algorithms for stronger
attacks. First, we slightly reformulate (2) to simplify the
constraint. We expand the constraint in (2), and jointly
maximize the objective over z and Π:
maximize
z,Π≥0
`(z, y)
subject to Π1 = x, Π>1 = z, 〈Π, C〉 ≤ δ.
Note that we have dropped the domain constraint z ∈ [0, 1]n,
which we will revisit in §5.3. We plug in the constraint
Π>1 = z into the objective to eliminate z:
maximize
Π≥0
`(Π>1, y) s.t. Π1 = x, 〈Π, C〉 ≤ δ, (3)
arriving at a constrained optimization problem w.r.t. Π alone
with two linear constraints on it. Yet, problem (2) and (3)
are clearly equivalent. Moreover, problem (3) has its own
interpretation: instead of maximizing the loss in the image
space, it maximizes the loss in the transportation space,
searching for a feasible transportation plan Π with cost no
greater than δ, to transport x to an adversarial example.
Given a solution Π to (3), we generate adversarial examples
by summing over the columns of Π, i.e., xadv = Π>1.
We note that ∇Π` = 1(∇xadv`)>, where ∇xadv` can be
computed efficiently using backpropagation.
We propose PGD and FW to optimize (3). While both PGD
and FW have been previously used to generate adversarial
examples (Madry et al., 2018; Chen et al., 2020), they are
based on the `p threat model that measures image pertur-
bations under the `p distance. Instead, for the Wasserstein
problem in (3), applying PGD and FW requires special-
ized algorithms for the projection operator and the linear
minimization oracle, which are the main goals of §3 and §4.
3. Projected Gradient with Dual Projection
We apply PGD to maximize (3) for generating Wasserstein
adversarial examples, and arrive at the following update rule
on the coupling matrix Π:
Π(t+1) = ProjC (G) , where
G = Π(t) + ηt∇Π`
(
(Π(t))>1, y
)
and ProjC (·) denotes the (Euclidean) projection operator
onto the convex set C, represented by the constraints in (3).
Namely, we take a gradient step and then project it back to
the feasible set. The projection operator ProjC (G) is given
by the following quadratic program:
minimize
Π≥0
1
2‖Π−G‖2F s.t. Π1 = x, 〈Π, C〉 ≤ δ. (4)
While any quadratic programming solver (e.g. interior point
method) could be used to solve (4), they do not scale well
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in high dimensions. For high resolution images, (4) could
involve millions of variables. Since this projection is called
in each iteration of PGD, it needs to be solved by a highly
efficient algorithm. Below, we exploit the structure of this
problem to design a fast specialized projection operator.
3.1. A First Attempt: Dykstra’s Projection
A simple observation is that the constraint in (4) is precisely
the intersection of the following two convex sets:
Cs =
{
Π ∈ Rn×n : Π ≥ 0, Π1 = x} , and
Ch =
{
Π ∈ Rn×n : 〈Π, C〉 ≤ δ} ,
where each row of Cs is a simplex constraint, requiring
Wassserstein adversarial examples to preserve total mass;
and Ch is a half space constraint, restricting the perturbation
budget of Wasserstein adversarial examples. It is known
that projection to the intersection of convex sets can be
computed by Dykstra’s algorithm (Boyle & Dykstra, 1986;
Dykstra, 1983), provided that the projection to each convex
set can be computed easily. Hence, our first attempt is to
apply Dykstra’s algorithm to solve (4) (see Appendix C
for a description of Dykstra’s algorithm and methods for
projection to each convex set). However, the convergence
rate of Dykstra’s algorithm highly relies on the geometry of
these two convex sets Cs and Ch (Deutsch & Hundal, 1994).
In fact, we observe that Dykstra’s algorithm converges very
slowly in some cases (see Appendix C).
3.2. Dual Projection
Instead, we develop a dual projection method which con-
verges much faster than Dykstra’s algorithm. By the method
of Lagrange multipliers, we derive the dual problem:
Proposition 1. The dual of (4) is
maximize
λ≥0
g(λ), where (5)
g(λ) = min
Π1=x,Π≥0
1
2‖Π−G‖2F + λ (〈Π, C〉 − δ) . (6)
In addition, the derivative of g(λ) at a point λ = λ˜ is
g′(λ˜) = 〈Π˜, C〉 − δ, where (7)
Π˜ = argmin
Π1=x,Π≥0
‖Π−G+ λ˜C‖2F. (8)
Both g(λ) and g′(λ) can be evaluated in O(n2 log n) time
deterministically for any given λ.
The derivation of Proposition 1 is based on the observation
that (6) is equivalent to computing a projection operator
ProjCs (G− λC). Since the constraint Cs is independent
for each row, it can be further reduced to projecting each row
ofG−λC to a simplex. The well-known simplex projection
Algorithm 1: Dual Projection
Input: G,C ∈ Rn×n, x ∈ Rn, δ > 0, l = 0, u > 0
Output: Π˜ ∈ Rn×n
1 while not converged do
2 λ˜ = 12 (l + u)
3 Π˜ = argminΠ1=x,Π≥0 ‖Π−G+ λ˜C‖2F
4 if 〈Π˜, C〉 > δ then l = λ˜
5 else u = λ˜
algorithm (e.g. Duchi et al., 2008) takes O(n log n) time,
thus the projection to Cs takes O(n2 log n) time.
Although this dual problem does not have a closed form
expression, Proposition 1 provides a method to evaluate
its objective and gradient, which is sufficient to use first
order optimization algorithms. Here, we choose a simple
algorithm with linear convergence rate, by exploiting the
fact that the dual objective (6) is a univariate function. First,
we derive an upper bound of the dual solution.
Proposition 2. The dual solution λ? of (5) satisfies
0 ≤ λ? ≤ 2 ‖vec(G)‖∞ + ‖x‖∞
mini6=j{Cij} . (9)
Since g(λ) is concave and differentiable, we make the fol-
lowing simple observation: (a) any point l > 0 with positive
derivative is a lower bound of λ?; (b) any point u > 0 with
negative derivative is an upper bound of λ?. Thus, we start
with the lower bound and upper bound in Proposition 2, and
use bisection method to search for λ?, by iteratively testing
the sign of the derivative. Eventually, the bisection method
converges to either a stationary point or the boundary λ = 0,
which are exactly maximizers in both cases. Since the bisec-
tion method halves the gap between lower and upper bounds
in each iteration, it converges linearly. Once we solve the
dual, we can recover the primal solution by the following.
Proposition 3. The primal solution Π? and the dual solu-
tion λ? satisfies
Π? = argmin
Π1=x,Π≥0
‖Π−G+ λ?C‖2F,
thus Π? can be computed in O(n2 log n) time given λ?.
The full dual projection is presented in Algorithm 1, where
u is initialized as the upper bound (9). A discussion of the
stopping criterion in Line 1 is deferred to Appendix B.
Finally, when the loss ` is convex (concave) in x, it is also
convex (concave) in Π after the reformulation in §2.2. In this
case, projected gradient with dual projection is guaranteed
to converge to a global optimum. When ` is nonconvex,
projected gradient still converges to a stationary point.
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4. Frank-Wolfe with Dual LMO
In this section, we apply the Frank-Wolfe algorithm (Frank
& Wolfe, 1956) to maximize (3). During each iteration, FW
first solves the following linear minimization problem:
Πˆ = argmin
Π∈C
〈Π, H〉 , where (10)
H = −∇Π`
(
(Π(t))>1, y
)
(11)
and C is the convex set represented by constraints in (3).
Then, we take a convex combination of Π(t) and Πˆ:
Π(t+1) = (1− ηt)Π(t) + ηtΠˆ.
Step (10) is referred as the linear minimization oracle
(LMO) in the literature, and is reduced to solving the fol-
lowing linear program in each iteration:
minimize
Π≥0
〈Π, H〉 s.t. Π1 = x, 〈Π, C〉 ≤ δ. (12)
Standard linear programming solvers do not scale well in
high dimensions. Instead, we exploit the problem structure
again to design a fast, specialized algorithm for (12).
4.1. A First Attempt: Optimizing the Dual
Our fist attempt is to extend the idea in §3 to the linear min-
imization step. We first derive an equivalent dual problem
via the method of Lagrange multipliers:
Proposition 4. The dual problem of (12) is
maximize
λ≥0
− λδ +
n∑
i=1
xi min
1≤j≤n
(
Hij + λCij
)
. (13)
In addition, we provide an upper bound of the maximizer.
Proposition 5. The dual solution λ? of (13) satisfies
0 ≤ λ? ≤ 2 ‖vec(H)‖∞
mini 6=j {Cij} . (14)
Unlike dual projection, the dual objective (13) here is not
differentiable. In fact, it is piecewise linear. Nevertheless,
one can still solve it using derivative-free methods such as
bisection method on the supergradient, or golden section
search on the objective, both of which converge linearly.
However, after obtaining the dual solution, one cannot re-
cover the primal solution easily. Consider the following
recovery rule by minimizing the Lagrangian:
Π? ∈ argmin
Π≥0,Π1=x
〈Π, H + λ?C〉 − λ?δ, (15)
where Π? and λ? are primal and dual solutions respectively.
There are two issues: (a) there might be infinitely many solu-
tions to (15) and it is not easy to determine Π? among them;
(b) even if the solution to (15) is unique, a slight numeri-
cal perturbation could change the minimizer drastically. In
practice, such instability may even result in an infeasible Π,
generating invalid adversarial examples outside the Wasser-
stein perturbation budget. We direct readers to Appendix D
for a concrete example and further discussions.
4.2. Dual LMO via Entropic Regularization
To address the above issues, we instead solve an entropic
regularized version of (12) as an approximation:
minimize
Π≥0
〈Π, H〉+ γ
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
Πij log Πij
subject to Π1 = x, 〈Π, C〉 ≤ δ,
(16)
where γ is a regularization parameter. The new objective
in (16) is strongly convex after the entropic regularization.
For any dual variable, the corresponding primal variable
minimizing the Lagrangian is always unique, which allows
us to recover the primal solution from dual easily.
Proposition 6. The dual problem of (16) is
maximize
λ≥0
− λδ + γ
∑
i:xi>0
xi log xi (17)
− γ
n∑
i=1
xi log
n∑
j=1
exp
(
−Hij + λCij
γ
)
.
The third term in (17) is essentially a softmin operator along
each row of H + λC, by observing that
lim
γ→0
−γ log
n∑
j=1
exp
(
−Hij+λCijγ
)
= min
1≤j≤n
(
Hij + λCij
)
.
Thus, from the point view of dual, (17) is a smooth approx-
imation of (13), recovering (13) precisely as γ → 0. In
our implementation, we use the usual log-sum-exp trick to
enhance the numerical stability of the softmin operator.
With entropic regularization, we have the following recovery
rule for primal solution and upper bound on dual solution.
Proposition 7. The primal solution Π? and the dual solu-
tion λ? satisfy
Π?ij = xi ·
exp
(
−Hij+λ?Cijγ
)
∑n
j=1 exp
(
−Hij+λ?Cijγ
) . (18)
Proposition 8. The dual solution λ? of (17) satisfies
0 ≤ λ? ≤
[
2 ‖vec(H)‖∞ + γ log
(
1
δx
>C1
)]
+
mini6=j {Cij} . (19)
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Note that the recovery rule (18) is essentially applying the
softmin activation along each row of H + λ?C. With the
upper bound (19), we can apply the same technique in §3
to solve the dual. In particular, the bisection method on the
dual objective results in an algorithm almost identical to
Algorithm 1 with only two exceptions: (a) we replace the
upper bound (9) with (19) and (b) we replace Line 3 with
the primal recover rule (18).
Unlike dual projection, the second order derivative of (17)
can be computed in a closed form, which enables the us-
age of second order methods, e.g., Newton’s method, for
further acceleration. However, we observed that Newton’s
method fails to converge in some cases. The smooth dual
(17), as an approximation of (13), still behaves similar to
a piecewise linear function after the regularization. Pure
Newton’s method might easily overshoot in this case. Thus,
we still choose bisection method due to its stability and
relatively fast convergence rate. In other applications where
the convergence speed of the dual is a concern, it is possible
to consider second order methods for acceleration.
Although both projected Sinkhorn (Wong et al., 2019) and
dual LMO use entropic approximation, we emphasize that
there are two key differences. First, the entropic regulariza-
tion in dual LMO does not affect the convergence rate. In
contrast, the convergence rate of projected Sinkhorn highly
depends on γ. In particular, small γ often slows down the
convergence rate empirically. Second, unlike the entropic
regularized quadratic program used in projected Sinkhorn,
entropic regularized linear program like (16) has been well
studied. Applications in optimal transport (Cuturi, 2013)
have demonstrated its empirical success; theoretical guaran-
tees on the exponential decay of approximation error have
been established (Cominetti & Martín, 1994; Weed, 2018).
For a thorough discussion on the convergence properties
of FW on convex or nonconvex functions and beyond, we
direct readers to (Yu et al., 2017).
5. Practical Considerations
In this section, we comment on some practical considera-
tions for implementations of algorithms in §3 and §4.
5.1. Acceleration via Exploiting Sparsity
Both algorithms in §3 and §4 require computation on a full
transportation matrix Π ∈ Rn×n, which is computationally
expensive and memory consuming, especially in high dimen-
sions. For example, for ImageNet where n = 224×224×3,
the transportation matrix Π has billions of variables. The
memory storage for it (using single precision floating num-
bers) exceeds the limit of most GPUs.
To accelerate computation and reduce memory usage, we en-
force a local transportation constraint to impose a structured
Figure 2: An illustration of 5× 5 local transportation.
sparsity in the transportation matrix (Wong et al., 2019).
Specifically, we only allow moving pixels in a k × k neigh-
borhood (see Figure 2). For images with multiple channels,
we only allow transportation within each channel. Adversar-
ial examples generated with these restrictions are still valid
under the original Wasserstein threat models.
With local transportation, each pixel can be only transported
to at most k2 possible locations, thus Π is a highly sparse
matrix with at most k2 nonzero entries in each row. Such
sparsity reduces the per iteration cost of dual projection
from O(n2 log n) to O(nk2 log k), and reduces that of dual
LMO from O(n2) to O(nk2), both of which are linear w.r.t.
n, treating k (typically much smaller than n) as a constant.
Operations on sparse matrices in general are not easy to
parallelize on GPUs. Nevertheless, for dual projection and
dual LMO, we do have simple customized strategies to
support the sparse operations on GPUs by exploring the
sparsity pattern in Π (see Appendix F.4 for a discussion).
5.2. Gradient Normalization
In both PGD and FW, we normalize the gradient in each
iteration by its largest absolute value of entries. For PGD,
gradient normalization is a standard practice, yielding con-
sistent scale of gradient and easing step size tuning. For
FW, normalization in the linear minimization step (12) does
not change the minimizer, but it does affect the scale of the
entropic regularization γ in (16). In this case, normaliza-
tion keeps the scale of entropic regularization consistent. In
addition, gradient normalization leads to more consistent
upper bounds on the dual solutions in (9) and (19).
5.3. Hypercube Constraint in Image Domain
For image domain adversarial examples, there is an addi-
tional hypercube constraint, e.g., xadv ∈ [0, 1]n if pixels
are represented by real numbers in [0, 1]. In practice, we
observe that solving problem (3) often generates adversarial
examples that violate the hypercube constraint, e.g., images
with pixel values exceeding 1. Although simply clipping
pixels can enforce the hypercube constraint, certain amount
of pixel mass is lost during clipping, leading to undefined
Wasserstein distance. This is in sharp contrast to `p threat
models, where clipping is the typical practice that still re-
tains validness of generated adversarial examples.
Stronger and Faster Wasserstein Adversarial Attacks
0 25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200
number of iterations
0
20
40
60
80
ad
ve
rs
ar
ial
 a
cc
ur
ac
y
adv acc v.s. iterations
dual proj. η=0.01
dual lmo
proj. sink. η=1.0
proj. sink. η=0.1
proj. sink. η=0.01
proj. sink. η=0.001
(a) CIFAR-10
0 25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200
number of iterations
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
ad
ve
rs
ar
ial
 a
cc
ur
ac
y
adv acc v.s. iterations
dual proj. η=0.01
dual lmo
proj. sink. η=1.0
proj. sink. η=0.1
proj. sink. η=0.01
proj. sink. η=0.001
(b) ImageNet
Figure 3: Adversarial accuracy of models w.r.t. different
iterations of attacks using  = 0.005. Projected Sinkhorn
uses γ = 5 · 10−5 on CIFAR-10 and 5 · 10−6 on ImageNet.
Dual LMO uses γ = 10−3 and decay schedule 2t+1 .
To address this issue, we develop another specialized
quadratic programming solver to project a transportation
matrix Π to the intersection of both constraints. To the best
of our knowledge, the hypercube constraint has not been ad-
dressed in previous study of Wasserstein adversarial attacks.
For instance, Wong et al. (2019) in their implementation
simply applied clipping regardless. This new algorithm,
however, is not as efficient as dual projection nor dual LMO.
Thus, we recommend using it as a post-processing proce-
dure on Π? at the very end (see Appendix G). Adversarial
attacks tend to be weaker after the post-processing. How-
ever, it ensures that the generated adversarial images satisfy
both the Wasserstein constraint and the hypercube constraint
simultaneously hence are genuinely valid.
6. Experiments
Datasets and models We conduct experiments on MNIST
(LeCun, 1998), CIFAR-10 (Krizhevsky, 2009) and Ima-
geNet (Deng et al., 2009). On MNIST and CIFAR-10, we
attack two deep networks used by Wong et al. (2019). On
ImageNet, we attack a 50-layer residual network (He et al.,
2016). ImageNet experiments are run on the first 100 sam-
ples in the validation set. See model details in appendix F.
Choice of cost Throughout the experiment, the cost matrix
C is defined as C(i1,j1)(i2,j2) =
√
(i1 − i2)2 + (j1 − j2)2,
namely, the Euclidean distance between pixel indices. We
use 5× 5 local transportation plan (see §5.1) to accelerate
computation of all algorithms.
Choice of γ We follow all parameter settings reported by
Wong et al. (2019) for projected Sinkhorn, except that we
try a few more γ. For dual LMO, we use a fixed γ = 10−3,
which we find to work well across different datasets.
Optimization parameters Stopping criteria of projected
Sinkhorn, dual projection and dual LMO, as well as the
choice of step sizes of PGD, are deferred to Appendix F. FW
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Figure 4: Per iteration running time (in milliseconds) of
different algorithms measured on a single P100 GPU.
uses a fixed decay schedule ηt = 2t+1 . Step sizes of PGD
are tuned in
{
1, 10−1, 10−2, 10−3
}
. Some experiments for
different step sizes are presented in §6.1.
6.1. Convergence Speed of Outer Maximization
Our method depends on a different but equivalent formu-
lation (3) that simplifies the constraint. It is reasonble to
ask: could the reformulation make the outer maximization
in PGD and FW harder? Intuitively, it does not, since the
formulation simply embeds a linear transformation before
the input layer (summation over columns of Π). To verify
this, we plot adversarial accuracy of models w.r.t. number of
iterations for different attack algorithms in Figure 3 to com-
pare their convergence rate of outer maximization. More
thorough results are deferred to Appendix F.5. 1
We observe that FW with the default decay schedule con-
verges very fast, especially at the initial stage. Meanwhile,
PGD with dual projection converges slightly faster than FW
with carefully tuned step sizes. In contrast, PGD with pro-
jected Sinkhorn barely decreases the accuracy when using
small step sizes. The output of projected Sinkhorn is only a
feasible point in the Wasserstein ball, rather than an accurate
projection, due to the crude approximation. If using small
step sizes, projected Sinkhorn brings the iterates of PGD
closer to the center of Wasserstein ball in every iteration.
Thus, the iterates always stay around the center of Wasser-
stein ball during the optimization, hence cannot decrease the
accuracy. To make progress in optimization, it is required to
use aggressively large step sizes (e.g. η = 1.0 and η = 0.1).
6.2. Attack Strength and Dual Convergence Speed
In Table 3, we compare (a) strength of different attacks
by adversarial accuracy, i.e. model accuracy under attacks
1The numbers in Figure 3 are meant for comparison of con-
vergence speed of Wasserstein constrained optimization problem.
Thus they are shown without the post-processing algorithm dis-
cussed in §5.3 and may differ slightly from those in Table 3.
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Table 3: Comparison of adversarial accuracy and average number of dual iterations. γ = 11000 on MNIST and γ =
1
3000 on
CIFAR-10 are the parameters used by Wong et al. (2019). “−” indicates numerical issues during computation.
method  = 0.1  = 0.2  = 0.3  = 0.4  = 0.5acc iter acc iter acc iter acc iter acc iter
M
N
IS
T
PGD + Proj. Sink. (γ = 1/1000) 96.5 92 91.2 88 78.0 85 59.1 82 40.1 80
PGD + Proj. Sink. (γ = 1/1500) 95.2 110 82.3 116 58.2 112 − − − −
PGD + Proj. Sink. (γ = 1/2000) − − − − − − − − − −
PGD + Dual Proj. 63.4 15 13.3 15 1.4 15 0.1 15 0.0 15
FW + Dual LMO (γ = 10−3) 67.5 15 16.9 15 2.2 15 0.4 15 0.1 15
PGD + Dual Proj. (w/o post-processing) 42.6 15 4.2 15 0.4 15 0.0 15 0.0 15
FW + Dual LMO (w/o post-processing) 48.3 15 6.7 15 1.0 15 0.3 15 0.1 15
method  = 0.001  = 0.002  = 0.003  = 0.004  = 0.005acc iter acc iter acc iter acc iter acc iter
C
IF
A
R
-1
0
PGD + Proj. Sink. (γ = 1/3000) 93.0 33 91.3 33 89.5 33 87.6 33 85.7 33
PGD + Proj. Sink. (γ = 1/10000) 89.9 79 84.5 79 78.3 79 71.9 79 65.6 79
PGD + Proj. Sink. (γ = 1/20000) − − − − − − − − − −
PGD + Dual Proj. 30.3 15 10.5 15 5.6 15 4.0 15 3.4 15
FW + Dual LMO (γ = 10−3) 33.5 15 13.6 15 7.2 15 4.7 15 3.7 15
PGD + Dual Proj. (w/o post-processing) 25.9 15 6.0 15 1.7 15 0.5 15 0.2 15
FW + Dual LMO (w/o post-processing) 29.6 15 9.1 15 3.2 15 1.1 15 0.6 15
method  = 0.001  = 0.002  = 0.003  = 0.004  = 0.005acc iter acc iter acc iter acc iter acc iter
Im
ag
eN
et
PGD + Proj. Sink. (γ = 1/100000) 68.0 42 61.2 43 59.2 43 55.8 43 52.4 43
PGD + Proj. Sink. (γ = 1/200000) 61.2 72 56.5 72 48.3 72 42.9 71 38.1 71
PGD + Proj. Sink. (γ = 1/1000000) − − − − − − − − − −
PGD + Dual Proj. 9.0 15 9.0 15 8.0 15 8.0 15 7.0 15
FW + Dual LMO 10.0 15 9.0 15 8.0 15 8.0 15 7.0 15
PGD + Dual Proj. (w/o post-processing) 0.0 15 0.0 15 0.0 15 0.0 15 0.0 15
FW + Dual LMO (w/o post-processing) 1.0 15 0.0 15 0.0 15 0.0 15 0.0 15
and (b) the running speed by the average number of dual
iterations. We observe that PGD with dual projection at-
tack and FW with dual LMO attack are generally stronger
than PGD with projected Sinkhorn, since the latter is only
an approximate projection hence it does not solve (2) ad-
equately. As γ decreases, PGD with projected Sinkhorn
gradually becomes stronger due to better approximation, but
at a cost of an increasing number of iterations to converge.
However, projected Sinkhorn is still weaker than PGD with
dual projection and FW with dual LMO, even after tuning
γ. Unfortunately, further decreasing γ runs into numerical
overflow. We notice that PGD with dual projection is often
slightly stronger than FW with dual LMO for two possible
reasons: the projection step is solved exactly without any
approximation error; we use the default decay schedule in
FW. Tuning the decay schedule for specific problems might
improve the attack strength and convergence speed of FW.
For completeness, we also report the results of dual pro-
jection and dual LMO without post-processing in Table 3.
After post-processing (see §5.3), the adversarial accuracy is
increased, sometimes by a lot. This is especially the case on
MNIST (e.g.,  = 0.1) where there are many white pixels,
thus it is very easy to violate the hypercube constraint. Note
that PGD with projected Sinkhorn might be even weaker
than what is indicated by the statistics in Table 3, if we post-
process its adversarial examples appropriately so that they
are genuinely valid. However, we do not have an efficient
algorithm for post-processing projected Sinkhorn, thus we
simply let it ignore the hypercube constraint. Even so, our
attacks are still much stronger than it.
Thanks to the bisection method and the tight upper bounds
(9) and (19), dual projection and dual LMO converge very
fast to high precision solutions. In practice, they often
terminate exactly in 15 iterations due to the consistent scales
of the upper bounds (see Appendix F.2 for a discussion).
On the other hand, projected Sinkhorn typically requires
more dual iterations. Besides convergence speed, we also
compare the real running time of a single dual iteration of all
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=
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(exact)
dual LMO
γ = 10−3
dual LMO
γ = 10
projected Sinkhorn
γ = 10−4
Figure 5: Wasserstein adversarial examples ( = 0.005)
generated by different algorithms on ImageNet. Perturba-
tions are normalized to [0, 1] for visualization. Dog faces
can be observed after zooming in.
three methods in Figure 4. On MNIST and CIFAR-10, dual
projection is 5 ∼ 7 times faster than projected Sinkhorn;
while on ImageNet, dual projection is roughly twice faster
than projected Sinkhorn. Meanwhile, dual LMO is 2 ∼ 3
times faster than dual projection due to the absence of the
extra logarithm factor. See Appendix F.9 for more details.
6.3. Entropic Regularization Reflects Shapes in Images
Wong et al. (2019) noted that Wasserstein perturbations
reflect shapes in original images. Instead, we argue that
it is the large entropic regularization that causes the phe-
nomenon. We visualize adversarial examples and perturba-
tions generated by different attacks in Figure 5 and Figure 6.
Perturbations generated by PGD with dual projection and
FW with dual LMO using small γ tend to be very sparse,
i.e., only moving a few pixels in the images. In compar-
ison, we gradually increase the entropic regularization in
dual LMO and eventually are able to reproduce the shape
reflection phenomenon observed by Wong et al. (2019). The
connection between entropic regularization and shape re-
flection phenomenon is deferred to Appendix F.8. The fact
that projected Sinkhorn generates adversarial perturbations
reflecting shapes in clean images could be another evidence
that the entropic regularization is too large. Notice that large
entropic regularization causes large approximation error,
thus potentially requires larger  in order to successfully
generate adversarial examples.
6.4. Improved Adversarial Training
Since we have developed stronger and faster attacks, it is nat-
ural to apply them in adversarial training (Madry et al., 2018)
clean dual proj. dual LMO
(γ = 10−3)
dual LMO
(γ = 10)
proj. Sink.
(γ = 1/3000)
Figure 6: Wasserstein adversarial examples ( = 0.002)
generated by different algorithms on CIFAR-10. Perturba-
tions reflect shapes in images only when using large entropic
regularization (the 6th and 8th columns).
to improve the robustness of adversarially trained models.
Indeed, models adversarially trained by our stronger attack
have much higher adversarial accuracy compared with mod-
els trained by projected Sinkhorn. We apply FW with dual
LMO in adversarial training due to its fast convergence
speed and fast per iteration running speed. On MNIST, we
produce a robust model with 59.7% accuracy against all
three attacks with perturbation budget  = 0.5, compared
with 0.6% using projected Sinkhorn. On CIFAR-10, we
produce a robust model with 56.8% accuracy against all
three attacks with perturbation budget  = 0.005, compared
with 41.2% using projected Sinkhorn. See Appendix F.11
for a thorough evaluation of adversarially trained models.
7. Conclusion
We have demonstrated that the previous Wasserstein ad-
versarial attack based on approximate projection is subop-
timal due to inaccurate projection. To generate stronger
Wasserstein adversarial attacks, we introduce two faster
and more accurate algorithms for Wasserstein constrained
optimization. Each algorithm has its own advantage thus
they complement each other nicely: PGD with dual projec-
tion employs exact projection and generates the strongest
attack. On the other hand, with minimal entropic smooth-
ing, FW with dual LMO is extremely fast in terms of both
outer maximization and linear minimization step without
much tuning of hyperparameters. Extensive experiments
confirm the effectiveness of our algorithms in two ways:
(a) properly evaluating Wasserstein adversarial robustness
and (b) improving robustness through adversarial training.
Finally, our algorithms impose minimal assumptions on the
cost matrix in Wasserstein distance, thus they can be di-
rectly applied to other applications involving Wasserstein
constrained optimization problems on discrete domains.
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A. Projected Sinkhorn
Here, we give a brief description of the approximate projection method proposed by Wong et al. (2019). The projection of a
(normalized) vector w to the Wasserstein ball centered at (normalized) x of radius of  = δ can be written as:
minimize
z,Π≥0
1
2
‖w − z‖22
subject to Π1 = x, Π>1 = z, 〈Π, C〉 ≤ .
The above objective is not strongly convex in Π, but can be made strongly convex by adding an entropic regularization:
minimize
z,Π≥0
1
2
‖w − z‖22 + γ
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
Πij log Πij
subject to Π1 = x, Π>1 = z, 〈Π, C〉 ≤ .
(20)
The parameter γ > 0 is the entropic regularization constant. Projected Sinkhorn solves (20) through block-coordinate
maximization on the dual problem of (20).
A.1. Analysis of Approximation Error in Projected Sinkhorn
To ensure small approximation error in (20), the scale of entropic regularization term should be at least much smaller than
the quadratic term:
γ
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
Πij log Πij  1
2
‖w − z‖22 .
Otherwise, the objective (20) is dominated by the entropic regularization. However, in practice, it is not always guaranteed,
especially when w is an interior point of the constraint in (20).
Consider an simple example where w = x = ( 1n ,
1
n , · · · 1n )>. In that case, the quadratic term 12‖x− z‖22 should be as small
as zero, since we can let z = x. However, if z = w = x, then Π could be a diagonal matrix diag
(
1
n ,
1
n , · · · 1n
)
(or more
generally, 1nP , where P is a permutation matrix). Thus, the entropic term becomes
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
Πij log Πij = − log n, (21)
reaching its maximum. The entropic regularization somewhat conflicts with the the quadratic term. Notice that the scale of
(21) is much larger than 12‖w − x‖22 (which is supposed to be very close to zero), especially when the dimension n is large.
Thus, the objective (20) may be dominated by the entropic regularization and solving the projection step accurately requires
very small γ.
We make two additional remarks. First, notice that the scale of (21) increases as n grows, which requires smaller γ to
balance the quadratic term and entropic regularization. This gives the intuition that projected Sinkhorn needs smaller γ in
higher dimensional spaces, which is observed in experiments.
Second, the key aspect of the above argument is that w is relatively close to x, e.g.W(w,x) ≤ , such that the quadratic
term is so small hence dominated by the entropic regularization. In the case where w is very far away from x, this argument
does not hold anymore. We believe this explains why large step sizes strengthen the attack when using PGD with projected
Sinkhorn in experiments. However, PGD with large step sizes tend to be unstable and may not converge to a good solution.
A.2. Toy Experiment in Table 2
Entries of a and b are sampled from a uniform distribution in [0, 1]400 independently. After sampling, both vectors are
normalized to ensure that the pixel mass summations are exactly 1. We reshape a and b to R20×20 and view them as images
in order to use the procedure of Wong et al. (2019). The cost matrix is induced by Euclidean norm between pixel indices
with 5× 5 local transportation plan.
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We use projected gradient descent and Frank-Wolfe to compute the projection by solving the following “reparametrized”
projection problem w.r.t. the coupling matrix:
minimize
Π
1
2
‖Π>1− b‖22
subject to Π ≥ 0,Π1 = a, 〈Π, C〉 ≤ .
The problem is equivalent to the Euclidean projection in the image space and is convex in Π. For PGD, we use step size
0.05. For Frank-Wolfe, we use γ = 10−3 and the default decay schedule 2t+1 . We let both algorithms run for sufficiently
many iterations in order to converge to high precision solutions.
B. Recommended Stopping Criterion for Bisection Search
When the derivative of the dual objective approaches zero, i.e., 〈Π, C〉 − δ ≈ 0, the comparison between 〈Π, C〉 − δ and 0
is getting numerically unstable. Thus, we recommend stopping the bisection method when either the derivative is close to
zero, or the gap between the lower bound l and the upper bound u is relatively small.
We recommend using an upper bound u to recover the coupling Π. Since an upper bound u always has a negative derivative,
thus the transportation cost constraint 〈Π, C〉 ≤ δ is always satisfied.
We highlight that the bisection method converges very fast in practice, since it shrinks the interval by a factor of 2 in every
iteration. Thus, it determines the next 3 digits of λ? after the decimal point after every 10 iterations.
For a concrete stopping criterion in our experiment, please refer to Appendix F.2.
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C. Dykstra’s Projection
Algorithm 2: Dykstra’s Projection Algorithm
Input: G ∈ Rn×n, two convex sets Cs and Ch
Output: The projection of G to Cs ∩ Ch
1 Π
(0)
h = G
2 I
(0)
s = I
(0)
h = O
3 for t = 0, 1, . . . ,maxiter do
4 Π
(t+1)
s = ProjCs
(
Π
(t)
h − I(t)s
)
5 I
(t+1)
s = Π
(t+1)
s −Π(t)h + I(t)s
6 Π
(t+1)
h = ProjCh
(
Π
(t+1)
s − I(t)h
)
7 I
(t+1)
h = Π
(t+1)
h −Π(t+1)s + I(t)h
8 return Π(t+1)s
Consider the projection of G ∈ Rn×n to the intersection of Cs and Ch, where Cs = {Π ∈ Rn×n : Π ≥ 0, Π1 = x} and
Ch = {Π ∈ Rn×n : 〈Π, C〉 ≤ δ}. Dykstra’s algorithm, applying to these two convex sets, is presented in Algorithm 2.
Intuitively, Dykstra’s algorithm projects G alternatively to Cs and Ch in each iteration. Notice that before projecting to Cs
(or Ch), the increment of the last iteration I(t)s (or I(t)h ) is subtracted from Π(t)h (or Π(t+1)s ). These increments play a crucial
role in the convergence of Dykstra’s algorithm. It has been shown that both Π(t)s and Π
(t)
h converge to the projection of G
onto Cs ∩ Ch (Dykstra, 1983; Boyle & Dykstra, 1986).
In order to implement Dykstra’s algorithm, we need two subroutines to compute the projection onto Cs and Ch respectively.
The projection onto Ch admits a closed form expression:
ProjCh (Π) = Π−
max{〈Π, C〉 − δ, 0}
‖C‖2F
C.
The projection onto Cs has an algorithm running in O(n2 log n) time, by projecting each row of G to a simplex. For the
simplex projection algorithm, we direct readers to (Duchi et al., 2008).
C.1. Toy Experiment for Dykstra’s Algorithm
0 1000 2000
num of iterations
10−2
10−1
simplex constraint
‖Π(t)h 1− x‖1
0 1000 2000
num of iterations
10−1
100
halfspace constraint
〈Π(t)s , C〉 − δ
Figure 7: Convergence of Dykstra’s algorithm. The violation of simplex constraint and halfspace constraint of Π(t)h and Π
(t)
s
(the iterates produced by Dykstra’s algorithm) gradually decrease to zero, but at a slow rate.
We randomly sample a vector x ∈ R100 and a coupling Π ∈ R100×100 (both from a uniform distribution in a hypercube).
We normalize x and Π. We then project Π to Cs ∩ Ch. We set δ = 1 and the cost matrix C is the same as the one in §6 (we
reshape x into a 10× 10 matrix and view it as an image). The convergence plots are shown in Figure 7. Dykstra’s algorithm
does converge, but at a slow rate.
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D. Toy Example: Failure of Dual Linear Minimization without Entropic Regularization
This section presents a simple example to demonstrate the failure of dual LMO without adding entropic regularization.
Let δ = 0.5, x = (1, 0)>. Let
G =
(
1 −1
0 0
)
, C =
(
0 1
1 0
)
.
Let
Π =
(
Π11 Π12
Π21 Π22
)
.
Then the primal linear program is
minimize
Π11,Π12≥0
Π11 −Π12
subject to Π11 + Π12 = 1,Π12 ≤ 0.5
It is easy to check that the solution is
Π? =
(
0.5 0.5
0 0
)
.
The dual linear program is
maximize
λ≥0
−1
2
λ+ min {1,−1 + λ}
It is easy to see that the dual problem has a unique solution λ? = 2. Now we try to use the following condition to recover
the primal solution:
Π? ∈ argmin
Π≥0,Π1=x
〈Π, G+ λ?C〉 − λ?δ, (22)
which is equivalent to
Π? ∈ argmin
Π≥0,Π1=x
〈
Π,
(
1 1
2 0
)〉
. (23)
But it turns out that any Π of the form
Π(α) =
(
α 1− α
0 0
)
,
where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, is a minimizer. By varying α, Π(α) can be suboptimal (α = 0), optimal (α = 0.5) or even infeasible
(α = 1). Thus, Π? cannot be recovered by only considering the stationary condition.
Of course it is possible to combine (22) with other KKT conditions (specifically, complementary slackness and primal
feasibility) to obtain one of the primal solutions. Particularly, in the above example, (22) along with the complementary
slackness determines the unique primal solution Π?. However, there are still two issues. The first issue is that in more
general cases, doing so requires solving a linear system whose variables are from a subset of Π, which could be GPU
unfriendly. More critically, the above solution is numerically unstable. Suppose that there is a slight numerical inaccuracy
due to floating point precision, such that (23) becomes
Π? ∈ argmin
Π≥0,Π1=x
〈
Π,
(
1 + ξ 1− ξ
2 0
)〉
. (24)
for some small constant ξ > 0. Now solving (24) gives
Π(1) =
(
0 1
0 0
)
,
which is infeasible.
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E. Proofs
This section presents all proofs in the paper. Recall that without loss of generality we assume that all entries in the cost
matrix C are nonnegative and only diagonal entries of C are zeros. All proofs below assume it implicitly.
E.1. Dual Projection
Proposition 1. The dual of (4) is
maximize
λ≥0
g(λ), where (5)
g(λ) = min
Π1=x,Π≥0
1
2‖Π−G‖2F + λ (〈Π, C〉 − δ) . (6)
In addition, the derivative of g(λ) at a point λ = λ˜ is
g′(λ˜) = 〈Π˜, C〉 − δ, where (7)
Π˜ = argmin
Π1=x,Π≥0
‖Π−G+ λ˜C‖2F. (8)
Both g(λ) and g′(λ) can be evaluated in O(n2 log n) time deterministically for any given λ.
Proof. Introducing the Lagrange multiplier λ ≥ 0 for the constraint 〈Π, C〉 ≤ δ, we arrive at the following dual problem
maximize
λ≥0
g(λ),
where
g(λ) = min
Π1=x,Π≥0
1
2
‖Π−G‖2F + λ (〈Π, C〉 − δ) .
We complete the square in the inner problem, which leads to
g(λ) = min
Π1=x,Π≥0
1
2
‖Π− (G− λC) ‖2F −
1
2
λ2‖C‖2F + λ〈G,C〉 − λδ.
Notice that the constraint in the minimization is independent for each row of Π. Thus, it can be reduced to a simplex
projection for each row of G− λC, which can be solved in O(n2 log n) time.
By Danskin’s theorem, g is differentiable and the derivative is
g′(λ˜) = 〈Π˜, C〉 − δ,
given the solution Π˜ to the minimization problem.
Before proving Proposition 2, we first prove Lemma 1, which characterizes the solution of simplex projection in a special
case. Intuitively, the projection of a vector to a simplex is very sparse if one of its entries is much larger than the others.
Lemma 1. Consider the following projection of a vector v to a simplex:
minimize
w∈Rn
‖w − v‖22
subject to
n∑
i=1
wi = z, wi ≥ 0,
where z > 0. Suppose that there exists i such that vi ≥ vj+z for all j 6= i. Then the solution isw? = (0, · · · 0, z, 0, · · · , 0)>,
where the only nonzero entry is w?i = z.
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Proof. A careful analysis of the simplex projection algorithm (Duchi et al., 2008) would give a proof. Here, we give an
alternative simple proof that does not rely on the algorithm. Assume to the contrary that there exists j 6= i such that w?j > 0
hence also w?i < z. We construct another feasible point wˆ by
wˆi = w
?
i + w
?
j
wˆj = 0
wˆk = w
?
k ∀k 6= i, k 6= j.
Comparing the objective value of w? and wˆ, we have
‖w? − v‖22 − ‖wˆ − v‖22 = (w?i − vi)2 + (w?j − vj)2 − (w?i + w?j − vi)2 − (0− vj)2
= 2w?j (vi − vj − w?i )
> 2w?j (vi − vj − z)
≥ 0.
wˆ has even smaller objective value than w?, contradicting the optimality of w?. Thus all w?j = 0 for all j 6= i, which
finishes the proof.
Proposition 2. The dual solution λ? of (5) satisfies
0 ≤ λ? ≤ 2 ‖vec(G)‖∞ + ‖x‖∞
mini6=j{Cij} . (9)
Proof. By Danskin’s theorem the dual problem (5) is differentiable in λ. Moreover, for any given λ˜, suppose the solution to
the minimization is Π˜, then the gradient w.r.t. λ˜ is 〈Π˜, C〉 − δ.
Consider the i-th row of G− λC. Assume on the contrary that
λ >
2 ‖vec(G)‖∞ + ‖x‖∞
mini 6=j{Cij} .
Then, for all i 6= j we have (recall that Cii = 0)
Gii = Gii − λCii > Gij − λCij + xi.
The condition in Lemma 1 is satisfied. A projection of G− λC results in a diagonal matrix Π˜. Thus
g′(λ˜) = 〈Π˜, C〉 − δ
=
∑
i=j
Π˜ijCij +
∑
i 6=j
Π˜ijCij − δ
= −δ.
The derivative is strictly negative, hence λ˜ is suboptimal, which finishes the proof.
Proposition 3. The primal solution Π? and the dual solution λ? satisfies
Π? = argmin
Π1=x,Π≥0
‖Π−G+ λ?C‖2F,
thus Π? can be computed in O(n2 log n) time given λ?.
Proof. This is a direct implication of KKT conditions.
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E.2. Dual Linear Minimization Oracle without Entropic Regularization
Proposition 4. The dual problem of (12) is
maximize
λ≥0
− λδ +
n∑
i=1
xi min
1≤j≤n
(
Hij + λCij
)
. (13)
Proof. Introducing the Lagrange multiplier λ ≥ 0 for the constraint 〈Π, C〉 ≤ δ, we arrive at the following dual problem
maximize
λ≥0
g(λ),
where
g(λ) = min
Π≥0,Π1=x
〈Π, H〉+ λ (〈Π, C〉 − δ)
= min
Π≥0,Π1=x
〈Π, H + λC〉 − λδ
= −λδ +
n∑
i=1
xi min
1≤j≤n
(
Hij + λCij
)
.
The last equality uses the fact that the constraints are independent for each row, thus the minimization is separable.
Proposition 5. The dual solution λ? of (13) satisfies
0 ≤ λ? ≤ 2 ‖vec(H)‖∞
mini 6=j {Cij} . (14)
Proof. A key observation is that the dual objective is a piece-wise linear function w.r.t. λ. We can roughly estimate the
range of the maximizer, by analyzing the slope of this function.
Suppose
λ >
2 ‖vec(H)‖∞
mini 6=j {Cij} . (25)
Then for all i 6= j, we have
λCij > Hii −Hij ,
which implies Hii + λCii < Hij + λCij for all i 6= j (recall that Cii = 0). Thus
g(λ) = −λδ +
n∑
i=1
xi min
1≤j≤n
(
Hij + λCij
)
= −λδ +
n∑
i=1
xi (Hii + λCii)
= −λδ +
n∑
i=1
xiHii
is a linear function with negative slope. Thus, any λ satisfies (25) cannot be a dual solution, which completes the proof.
E.3. Dual Linear Minimization Oracle with Dual Entropic Regularization
Proposition 6. The dual problem of (16) is
maximize
λ≥0
− λδ + γ
∑
i:xi>0
xi log xi (17)
− γ
n∑
i=1
xi log
n∑
j=1
exp
(
−Hij + λCij
γ
)
.
Stronger and Faster Wasserstein Adversarial Attacks
Proof. Introducing the Lagrange multiplier λ ≥ 0 for the constraint 〈Π, C〉 ≤ δ, we arrive at the following dual problem
maximize
λ≥0
g(λ),
where
g(λ) = min
Π≥0,Π1=x
〈Π, H〉+ γ
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
Πij log Πij + λ(〈Π, C〉 − δ) (26)
= min
Π≥0,Π1=x
−λδ + 〈Π, H + λC〉+ γ
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
Πij log Πij . (27)
Without loss of generality, we assume that xi is strictly positive for all i. Otherwise, xi = 0 implies Πij = 0 for all j, thus
the i-th row of Π does not even appear in the minimization.
Notice that the inner minimization in (27) is separable, since the constraint on Π is independent for each row. For each row,
the minimization is equivalent to a Kullback–Leibler projection to a simplex, which admits a closed form. For the sake of
completeness, we give a derivation here. For the i-th row,
n∑
j=1
Πij (Hij + λCij) + γ
n∑
j=1
Πij log Πij = γ
n∑
j=1
Πij log
Πij
exp
(
−Hij+λCijγ
)
= γ
n∑
j=1
Πij
log Πij/xi
exp
(
−Hij+λCijγ
)
/a
+ log xi − log a

= γ
n∑
j=1
Πij log
Πij/xi
exp
(
−Hij+λCijγ
)
/a
+ γxi (log xi − log a)
≥ γxi (log xi − log a) ,
where a =
∑n
j=1 exp
(
−Hij+λCijγ
)
is a normalization constant. The last inequality holds if and only if
Πij = xi
exp
(
−Hij+λCijγ
)
∑n
j=1 exp
(
−Hij+λCijγ
) .
Plugging in the above expression finishes the proof.
Proposition 7. The primal solution Π? and the dual solution λ? satisfy
Π?ij = xi ·
exp
(
−Hij+λ?Cijγ
)
∑n
j=1 exp
(
−Hij+λ?Cijγ
) . (18)
Proof. This is a direct implication of KKT conditions. See the KL projection derivation in the proof of Proposition 6 for a
detailed explanation.
Proposition 8. The dual solution λ? of (17) satisfies
0 ≤ λ? ≤
[
2 ‖vec(H)‖∞ + γ log
(
1
δx
>C1
)]
+
mini 6=j {Cij} . (19)
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Proof. To begin with, we have the following bound on the derivative:
g′(λ) = −δ +
n∑
i=1
xi
∑n
j=1 exp
(
−Hij+λCijγ
)
Cij∑n
j=1 exp
(
−Hij+λCijγ
)
= −δ +
n∑
i=1
xi
∑n
j=1 exp
(
−Hij+λCij−Hiiγ
)
Cij∑n
j=1 exp
(
−Hij+λCij−Hiiγ
)
= −δ +
n∑
i=1
xi
∑
j 6=i exp
(
−Hij+λCij−Hiiγ
)
Cij
1 +
∑
j 6=i exp
(
−Hij+λCij−Hiiγ
)
≤ −δ +
n∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
xi exp
(
−Hij + λCij −Hii
γ
)
Cij .
The first equality uses translation invariance property of softmin function. The last inequality uses the fact that Cii = 0.
Notice that
λ >
[
2 ‖vec(H)‖∞ + γ log
(
1
δx
>C1
)]
+
mini6=j {Cij}
implies
λCij > 2 ‖vec(H)‖∞ + γ log
(
1
δ
x>C1
)
≥ Hii −Hij + γ log
(
1
δ
x>C1
)
,
for all i 6= j. Thus, we have
exp
(
−Hij + λCij −Hii
γ
)
<
δ
x>C1
for all i 6= j. Plug it back to g′(λ). We have
g′(λ) < −δ + δ
x>C1
·
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
xiCij
= −δ + δ
x>C1
· x>C1
= 0.
The derivative is strictly negative hence λ cannot be optimal, which concludes the proof.
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F. Further Experimental Details
In this section, we present further experimental details as well as some implementation details.
F.1. Models
Our MNIST and CIFAR-10, models are taken from (Wong et al., 2019). The MNIST model is a convolutional network with
ReLU activations which achieves 98.89% clean accuracy. The CIFAR-10 model is a residual network with 94.76% clean
accuracy. The ImageNet model is a ResNet-50 pretrained neural network, downloaded from PyTorch models subpackage,
which achieves 72.0% top-1 clean accuracy on the first 100 samples from the validation set. All experiments are run on a
single P100 GPU.
F.2. Stopping Criteria of Projection and Linear Minimization Step
Stopping criterion of projected Sinkhorn Denote obj(t) as the dual objective value of projected Sinkhorn in t-th iteration,
we stop the algorithm upon the following condition is satisfied:
|obj(t+1) − obj(t)| ≤ 10−4 + 10−4 · obj(t),
which is also used by Wong et al. (2019).
Stopping criterion of dual projection and dual LMO Both dual projection and dual LMO use the bisection method to
solve dual problems. Bisection is terminated upon either
u− l ≤ 10−4 or |g′(λ˜)| ≤ 10−4
This condition lets us determine the 4-th digit after the decimal point of λ?, or the violation of transportation cost constraint
is less than 10−4. Note that a violation of 10−4 is extremely small, compared with δ = 
∑n
i=1 xi, which is much (usually
at least 105 times) larger than the tolerance since the pixel sum
∑n
i=1 xi is usually a large number.
In practice, the upper bound (9) and (19) are often between 2 and 3 thanks to gradient normalization. Thus, the bisection
method satisfies the stopping criterion in at most 15 iterations (2× 2−15 ≈ 10−4).
F.3. Step Sizes of PGD
PGD with projected Sinkhorn On MNIST, CIFAR-10 and ImageNet, the step sizes are set to 0.1. Notice that 0.1 is also
the step size used by Wong et al. (2019) on MNIST and CIFAR-10. The gradient is normalized using `∞ norm:
argmax
‖v‖∞≤1
v>∇x`(x, y) = sign (∇x`(x, y)) .
Again, this is the same setting used by Wong et al. (2019). While η = 1.0 achieves lower adversarial accuracy on the first
batch of samples in Appendix F.5, we find this large step size causes numerical overflow easily on the remaining batches.
Thus we choose η = 0.1 to present the experimental results.
PGD with dual projection On MNIST, the step size is set to 0.1. On CIFAR-10 and ImageNet, the step size is set to 0.01.
The gradient is normalized in the following way:
∇Π`(Π>1, y)
maxi,j |∇Π`(Π>1, y)| .
F.4. Implementation of Local Transportation and Sparse Matrices Computation
The local transportation technique in §5.1 requires computation on a sparse matrix Π. However, a big challenge is that sparse
matrices computation is not easily parallelizable on GPUs. As such, current deep learning packages (PyTorch, TensorFlow)
do not support general sparse matrices well.
To fully utilize GPU acceleration, we explore the sparsity pattern in Π. Notice that each row of Π has at most k2 nonzero
entries. We store Π as a n× k2 dense matrix, with some possible dummy entries. The advantage is that now Π is a dense
matrix. Any row operations on Π (e.g. softmin along each row, sorting along each row) can be parallelized easily. The
downside, however, is that column operations (e.g. summation over each column) might take extra efforts. Nevertheless, this
is not a bottleneck of the speed of dual projection and dual LMO, since they only require efficient row operations.
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F.5. Further Results on Convergence of Outer Maximization
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(a) loss w.r.t. iterations on CIFAR-10
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(b) adversarial accuracy w.r.t. iterations on CIFAR-10
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(c) loss w.r.t. iterations on ImageNet
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(d) adversarial accuracy w.r.t. iterations on ImageNet
Figure 8: Convergence of outer maximization of different attacks.
We plot the loss and adversarial accuracy w.r.t. the number of iterations in Figure 8 ( = 0.005 on both CIFAR-10 and
ImageNet). Dual LMO uses γ = 10−3. Projected Sinkhorn uses γ = 5 · 10−5 on CIFAR-10 and γ = 5 · 10−6 on ImageNet.
Frank-Wolfe with dual LMO FW uses the default decay schedule 2t+1 . We observe that FW with dual LMO converges
very fast especially at the initial stage, even when using the simple default decay schedule.
PGD with Projected Sinkhorn We observe that when η is small (e.g. η = 0.01, 0.001), PGD with projected Sinkhorn
barely makes progress in the optimization. While aggressively large step sizes (e.g. 1.0 and 0.1) can make progress, the
curves are very noisy indicating the steps sizes are too large, and the loss is still much lower than the other two attacks.
PGD with Dual Projection In contrast, PGD with dual projection has more meaningful curves: small η (e.g. 0.001)
converges very slowly; large η (e.g. 1.0 and 0.1) makes the curves noisy, while appropriate choice of η (e.g. 0.01) always
achieves the highest loss and also the lowest adversarial accuracy. In these cases, PGD with dual projection converges
comparably and sometimes slightly faster than Frank-Wolfe.
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F.6. MNIST and CIFAR-10 Adversarial Examples
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(a) MNIST
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Figure 9: Comparison of Wasserstein adversarial examples and Wasserstein perturbations generated by different attacks on
MNIST ( = 0.2) and CIFAR-10 ( = 0.002). Predicted labels are shown on the top of images. Perturbations are scaled
linearly to [0, 1] for visualization.
Wasserstein adversarial perturbations generated by PGD with dual projection and FW with dual LMO (γ = 10−3) are very
sparse. Hence, they do not reflect the shapes in the clean images. Perturbations reflect the shapes only when the entropic
regularization introduces large approximation error (e.g. FW with dual LMO (γ = 10) and PGD with projected Sinkhorn).
For the sake of visualization of the approximation error, we let PGD use smaller step sizes (η = 0.01) and more iterations
(1000) when combined with projected Sinkhorn.2 We observe that using large step size, e.g., η = 0.1, often generates blurry
perturbations (not necessarily reflecting shapes clearly). But they are still much more dense compared with adversarial
perturbations generated dual projection and dual LMO (γ = 10−3).
2This is the same case for Figure 6 in the main paper. Notice that our normalization method is slightly different from that of Wong
et al. (2019), which might account for the slight difference of the visualization results.
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F.7. ImageNet Adversarial Examples
(a) Dual projection (b) Dual LMO (γ = 10−3)
(c) Dual LMO (γ = 10) (d) Projected Sinkhorn (γ = 10−4)
Figure 10: Comparison of Wasserstein adversarial examples generated by different attacks ( = 0.005). Notice that
adversarial pertubations reflect shapes in the images only when the entropic regularization is large (bottom two subfigures).
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F.8. Why Does Entropic Regularization Reflect Shapes in Images?
A large entropic regularization term in the optimization objective (of projected Sinkhorn and dual LMO) encourages the
transportation to be uniform, thus each pixel tends to spread its mass evenly to its nearby pixels. In the region where pixel
intensities do not change much, the transportations cancel out; while in the region where pixel intensities change drastically
(e.g., edges in an image), pixel mass flows from the high pixel region to low pixel region. As a result, it reflects the edges in
the original image.
F.9. Analysis of Running Time of Projected Sinkhorn
One possible explanation for slow per iteration running speed of projected Sinkhorn is that, each iteration of projected
Sinkhorn requires solving n nonlinear univariate equations. In implementation, this step is done by calling Lambert function,
which eventually calls Halley’s method, a root-finding algorithm. While solving each nonlinear equation is counted as
O(1) in analysis, this operation is potentially much more expensive than other basic arithmetic operations (e.g. addition
and multiplication). In contrast, both dual projection and dual linear minimization only rely on more standard arithmetic
operations (e.g. multiplication, division and comparison, logarithm and exponential functions).
We test the running time of the nonlinear equation solvers in experiments. On a single RTX 2080 Ti GPU, for a batch of
100 samples on MNIST, we observe that Lambert function evaluation takes about 26% of the running time during each
iteration of projected Sinkhorn. For a batch of 100 samples on CIFAR-10, Lambert function evaluation takes about 28% of
the running time during each iteration of projected Sinkhorn. For a batch of 50 samples on ImageNet, Lambert function
evaluation takes about 32% of the running time of one iteration of projected Sinkhorn.
We note that GPU time recording is somewhat inconsistent on different machines. In our case, all experiments in the main
paper are run on a single P100 GPU on a cluster. However, on a 2080 Ti local GPU, we observe that projected Sinkhorn is
slightly faster than dual projection on ImageNet in terms of per iteration running time (but still at least twice slower than
dual LMO). While on MNIST and CIFAR-10, dual projection and dual LMO are consistently faster than projected Sinkhorn,
both on P100 cluster and 2080 Ti local machine.
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F.10. Case Study: Feasibility of Generated Wasserstein Adversarial Examples
In this section, we present a sanity check of feasibility of adversarial examples generated by different algorithms on MNIST.
Table 4: A sanity check of feasibility of Wasserstein adversarial examples generated by different algorithms on MNIST.
2nd column: The average Wasserstein distance between adversarial examples and clean images (the higher the better).
3rd column: The maximum pixel value in the generated adversarial examples (the lower the better). 4th column: The
percentage of pixel mass that exceeds 1 (the lower the better). The third and the forth columns are largest values over a
mini-batch, while the second column is the average over a mini-batch.
method W(x,xadv) maxi {xi}
∑n
i=1 max{xi−1,0}∑n
i=1 xi
PGD + Proj. Sink. (γ = 1/1000) 0.109965 1.474048 3.646899%
PGD + Dual Proj. (w/o post-processing) 0.493146 4.118621 15.812986%
PGD + Dual Proj. 0.444885 1.000030 0.000034%
FW + Dual LMO (w/o post-processing) 0.428238 3.955514 10.406417%
FW + Dual LMO 0.399014 1.000015 0.000025%
Setup We test all attacks on the first 100 samples on the test set of MNIST with  = 0.5. All parameter settings are the same
as the table in the main paper. Dual LMO uses γ = 10−3 and projected Sinkhorn uses γ = 1/1000.
Wasserstein Constraint The (exact) Wasserstein distances presented in Table 4 are calculated by a linear programming
solver. We observe that all adversarial examples strictly satisfy the the Wasserstein constraintW(x,xadv) ≤ 0.5. We also
observe that the Wasserstein adversarial examples generated by PGD with dual projection and FW with dual LMO have
much larger Wasserstein distance than those of projected Sinkhorn. This again hightlights that projected Sinkhorn is only an
approximate projection operator, thus PGD cannot fully explore the Wasserstein ball, resulting in a weak attack.
Hypercube Constraint Without post-processing, all attacks generate Wasserstein adversarial examples that violate the
hypercube constraint a lot. However, after applying our post-processing algorithm, the generated Wasserstein adversarial
examples roughly satisfy the hypercube constraint [0, 1]n up to a reasonable precision.
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F.11. Adversarially Trained Models
In this section, we present additional experiments on adversarial training and attacking adversarially trained models.
F.11.1. MNIST
We adversarially train a robust model using Frank-Wolfe with dual LMO and a fixed perturbation budget  = 0.3. The
inner maximization is approximated with 40 iterations of Frank-Wolfe.3 This model achieves 95.83% clean accuracy. The
adversarial accuracy of this model is shown in Table 5.
For comparison, we also present results on attacking an adversarially trained model by PGD with projected Sinkhorn. We
use a pretrained model released by Wong et al. (2019), which is adversarially trained using an adaptive perturbation budget
 ∈ [0.1, 2.1]. This model achieves 97.28% clean accuracy.
We notice that the model adversarially trained by PGD with projected Sinkhorn seems to overfit to the same attack. Compared
with the standard trained model in Table 3, the adversarially trained model has higher adversarial accuracy under projected
Sinkhorn, but has lower adversarial accuracy under our stronger attacks.
In Table 6, the post-processing algorithm does not work quite well with Frank-Wolfe. Normally, increasing the perturbation
budget  should decrease the adversarial accuracy. Indeed, if we do not post-process the output, the adversarial accuracy
decreases monotonically for Frank-Wolfe. However, after post-processing, the adversarial accuracy increases a lot, and
even increases as the the perturbation budget increases. For this model, our post-processing algorithm does not seems to
be “compatible” with Frank-Wolfe. Doing a better job on optimizing the Wasserstein constrained problem ignoring the
hypercube constraint does not necessarily give a good solution to the problem with hypercube constraint.
Table 5: MNIST model adversarially trained by Frank-Wolfe with dual LMO ( = 0.3).
method  = 0.1  = 0.2  = 0.3  = 0.4  = 0.5
PGD + Proj. Sink. (γ = 1/1000) 94.9 94.0 93.0 91.9 90.5
PGD + Proj. Sink. (γ = 1/1500) 94.5 93.2 91.5 89.3 86.8
PGD + Proj. Sink. (γ = 1/2000) − − − − −
PGD + Dual Proj. 92.6 87.8 80.2 70.7 59.7
FW + Dual LMO 92.5 88.1 82.1 75.3 66.8
PGD + Dual Proj. (w/o post-processing) 91.1 82.9 71.3 58.4 44.6
FW + Dual LMO (w/o post-processing) 91.1 83.9 73.9 63.0 50.9
Table 6: MNIST model adversarially trained by PGD with projected Sinkhorn.
method  = 0.1  = 0.2  = 0.3  = 0.4  = 0.5
PGD + Proj. Sink. (γ = 1/1000) 95.0 92.4 90.5 88.5 86.5
PGD + Proj. Sink. (γ = 1/1500) 93.8 90.0 82.7 85.2 90.5
PGD + Proj. Sink. (γ = 1/2000) − − − − −
PGD + Dual Proj. 1.1 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.6
FW + Dual LMO 4.8 21.6 34.5 39.2 39.6
PGD + Dual Proj. (w/o post-processing) 1.0 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3
FW + Dual LMO (w/o post-processing) 0.8 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0
3We also have tried larger perturbation budgets  = 0.4 and  = 0.5, but the training collapses.
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F.11.2. CIFAR-10
We adversarially train a robust model using Frank-Wolfe with dual LMO and a fixed perturbation budget  = 0.005. The
inner maximization is approximated with at most 30 iterations of Frank-Wolfe. This model achieves 82.57% clean accuracy.
The adversarial accuracy of this model is shown in Table 7.
For comparison, we also present results on attacking an adversarially trained model by PGD with projected Sinkhorn. We
use a pretrained model released by Wong et al. (2019), which is adversarially trained using an adaptive perturbation budget
 ∈ [0.01, 0.38]. This model achieves 81.68% clean accuracy.
Table 7: CIFAR-10 model adversarially trained by Frank-Wolfe with dual LMO ( = 0.005)
method  = 0.001  = 0.002  = 0.003  = 0.004  = 0.005
PGD + Proj. Sink. (γ = 1/3000) 82.4 82.3 82.1 81.9 81.8
PGD + Proj. Sink. (γ = 1/10000) 82.0 81.5 81.0 80.6 80.1
PGD + Proj. Sink. (γ = 1/20000) − − − − −
PGD + Dual Proj. 76.8 71.8 67.0 62.0 56.8
FW + Dual LMO 77.4 73.7 70.2 66.8 62.6
PGD + Dual Proj. (w/o post-processing) 76.5 71.3 66.4 61.4 56.2
FW + Dual LMO (w/o post-processing) 77.2 73.7 70.4 67.3 63.9
Table 8: CIFAR-10 model adversarially trained by PGD with projected Sinkhorn.
method  = 0.001  = 0.002  = 0.003  = 0.004  = 0.005
PGD + Proj. Sink. (γ = 1/3000) 81.7 81.6 81.6 81.6 81.5
PGD + Proj. Sink. (γ = 1/10000) 81.6 81.4 81.3 81.2 81.0
PGD + Proj. Sink. (γ = 1/20000) − − − − −
PGD + Dual Proj. 72.5 64.4 56.3 48.8 42.2
FW + Dual LMO 72.4 64.0 55.5 47.8 41.2
PGD + Dual Proj. (w/o post-processing) 72.0 63.3 54.9 47.2 40.6
FW + Dual LMO (w/o post-processing) 71.7 62.2 52.9 44.7 37.5
Stronger and Faster Wasserstein Adversarial Attacks
G. Post-processing: Capacity Constrained Projection for Hypercube Constraint
In this section, we present the post-processing algorithm mentioned in §5.3.
G.1. Algorithm
Suppose that pixel values of input images are represented by real numbers in [0, 1]n. We need to add one additional
constraint Π>1 ≤ 1, which results in the following Euclidean projection problem:
minimize
Π≥0
1
2
‖Π−G‖2F
subject to Π1 = x, Π>1 ≤ 1, 〈Π, C〉 ≤ δ.
(28)
We call this problem a capacity constrained projection, since the additional constraint essentially specifies the maximum
mass that a pixel location can receive. We introduce the partial Lagrangian to derive the following dual problem:
maximize
λ≥0,µ≥0
g(λ,µ),
where
g(λ,µ) = min
Π≥0,Π1=x
1
2
‖Π−G‖2F + λ (〈Π, C〉 − δ) + µ>
(
Π>1− 1)
= min
Π≥0,Π1=x
1
2
‖Π−G‖2F + λ (〈Π, C〉 − δ) + 〈Π,1µ>〉 − µ>1
= min
Π≥0,Π1=x
1
2
‖Π−G+ λC + 1µ>‖2F − 〈G,λC + 1µ>〉+
1
2
‖λC + 1µ>‖2F − λδ − µ>1
We optimize g(λ,µ) by alternating maximization on λ and µ respectively: fixing µ, we maximize λ via bisection method;
fixing λ, we maximize µ via k steps gradient ascent with nesterov acceleration, where k is a hyperparameter. Evaluating the
gradient of µ in bisection method, as well as evaluating the gradient of µ, can be reduced to simplex projections following
similar derivations in dual projection (§3).
Due to sublinear convergence rate of gradient ascent, it may be slow to obtain a very high precision solution. However,
empirical evidences show that a few hundred alternating maximization (with k around 10 or 20) converges to a solution with
reasonable precision (e.g. satisfying hypercube constraint up to the third digit after the decimal point), and convergence to
these modest precision solutions is already sufficient for generating valid Wasserstein adversarial examples.
H. Additional Related Work
In this section, we comment on a few more works related to threat models beyond the standard `p metric. A number
of authors have recently explored geometric transformations as an adversarial attack against deep models. As already
mentioned in the main paper, (Engstrom et al., 2019) studied adversarial rotations and translations where perturbation
is measured by the degree of rotation and translation. Similarly, Alaifari et al. (2019) Alaifari et al. (2019) considered
adversarial deformations and used the maximum Euclidean size of the deformation as the perturbation budget. Kanbak
et al. (2018) studied the more general case where spatial transformation is parameterized as a Lie group, and employed the
geodesic distance in the image appearance manifold to measure perturbation size. Xiao et al. (2018), on the other hand,
modeled spatial transformations as a vector flow and used the total variation of the flow to measure perturbation size. On
a high level, spatial transformation shares some similarity with the Wasserstein threat model, as they both involve pixel
mass movement. In fact, the Wasserstein threat model can be treated as a further relaxation of spatial transformations,
where we are not only allowed to move pixels but also to change pixel values (e.g. pixel mass splitting). In this sense, the
Wasserstein threat model is a combination of spatial transformation and the standard `p additive perturbation, although
the way it measures perturbation is entirely different from either. All of the above methods employ first order gradient
algorithms to solve their respective optimization problems. We note that some authors, e.g. Athalye et al. (2018); Li et al.
(2019), have already considered physical attack for real world objects.
Lastly, we mention that certification algorithms for spatial transformations and the Wasserstein threat model have recently
been developed by Balunovic et al. (2019) and Levine & Feizi (2019), respectively.
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